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ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM’S LAND TITLE
THEORY
CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON*
ABSTRACT
In the mid-1990s, mortgage bankers created Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to escape the costs associated
with recording mortgage transfers. To accomplish this, lenders per-
manently list MERS as the mortgagee of record instead of themselves
to avoid the expense of recording any subsequent transfers. MERS’s
claim that it is both an agent of the lender and the mortgagee, and
the huge gaps left in the public record, give rise to a range of legal
issues. This Article addresses whether security agreements naming
MERS as a mortgagee meet traditional conveyance requirements and
discusses the rights of counties to recover unpaid recording fees. The
author explores the challenges facing judges, legislators, county
recorders, and investors who must resolve these issues to rebuild
confidence in real property recording systems.
* Associate Dean for Academ ic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J.
Quinney College of Law. The author wishes to thank the following people for helpful
conversations, comm ents, encouragement, research assistance, or suggestions: Richard
Aaron, Abraham Bates, Gregory Clark, Thomas Cox, Lynn Drysdale, Christian Johnson, Max
Gardner, Kathleen Keest, Robert Hager, Rebecca Holt, Tera Peterson, Rylee McDermott,
Nancy M cLaughlin, Mark Monacelli, Steven Ramirez, Michael W olf, Alan White, and Nick
W ooten.
111
112 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:111
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
I. THE EVOLVING LEGAL FOUNDATION OF MERS. . . . . . . . . . . . 114
II. GATHERING STORM CLOUDS OF TITLE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
III. MERS AND THE PROBLEM OF CONVEYANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
IV. WHAT ABOUT THE MONEY? THE RIGHT OF 
COUNTIES TO RECOVER UNPAID RECORDING FEES. . . . . . . . . 143
V. REBUILDING A TRUSTWORTHY REAL PROPERTY 
RECORDING SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
2011] TWO FACES 113
INTRODUCTION
In Roman mythology, the god Janus, for whom each year’s
first month is named, was the deity of beginnings and endings.1
According to legend, the titan Saturn gave the two-faced god the
power to see both the future and the past.  Romans carved both of2
Janus’ two faces on gates and doorways to solemnize momentous
transitions.  Most notably, in the Roman Forum, the Senate erected3
the ritual gates called the Janus Geminus, which the Romans
opened in times of conflict.  At war’s outset, priests made sacrifices4
here to curry favor from the gods and forecast the prospects of
success.5
No deity better symbolizes what financiers hoped to create when
they founded the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS).
MERS sits as a dichotomous, enigmatic gatekeeper on the vestibule
of our nation’s complex and turbulent mortgage finance industry.
Financiers invoked MERS’s name at the beginning of millions of
subprime and exotic mortgage loan transactions and again invoke
its name as they attempt to terminate so many of these loans
through foreclosure. Like Janus, MERS is two-faced: impenetrably
claiming to both own mortgages and act as an agent for others who
also claim ownership.
This Article examines recent case law developments in an update
to an earlier article on the legal problems associated with MERS.6
In particular, this Article looks at several of the most fundamental
unanswered legal issues regarding MERS’s role in mortgage
lending. First, given recent cases questioning MERS’s ownership
interests in loans registered in its database, do security agreements
naming MERS as a mortgagee or deed of trust beneficiary actually
1. See MIKE DIXON-KENNEDY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GRECO-ROMAN MYTHOLOGY 179 (1998).
2. JOËL SCHMIDT, LAROUSSE GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOLOGY 150 (Seth Benardete ed.,
1980).
3. ARTHUR COTTERELL, THE MACMILLAN ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MYTHS &
LEGENDS 112 (1989).
4. See OVID, FASTI 19-21 (James George Frazer trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed.
1959) (ca. 8 C.E.).
5. See COTTERELL, supra note 3, at 112.
6. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System , 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359 (2010).
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succeed in conveying a property interest? Second, because financial
institutions used MERS to avoid paying billions of dollars in
recording fees to county and state governments, should these gov-
ernments—many of which are facing dire financial crises—be
entitled to recoup unpaid recording fees? Third, and perhaps most
importantly, does the fact that such fundamental issues remain live
controversies tell us something more about the commercial norms
our country needs in order to rebuild a trustworthy financial
system?
This Article begins with a short introduction to MERS’s role in
residential mortgage finance, including the still evolving legal
foundation of the company’s business model. Part II ponders the
long-term effects of MERS on land title. Part III explores whether
security agreements naming MERS as a mortgagee or deed of trust
beneficiary meet traditional common law title conveyance require-
ments. Part IV explores the financial industry’s exposure to county
and state government lawsuits seeking to recoup unpaid recording
fees. This Article concludes by reflecting on the difficult position
facing appellate judges and legislators who will be responsible for
resolving these controversies, and that of investors contemplating
the purchase of MERS-recorded mortgages.
I. THE EVOLVING LEGAL FOUNDATION OF MERS
Since the founding of the American republic, each county in the
United States has maintained records of who owns the land within
that county.  Most states track changes in ownership of land, in-7
cluding mortgages and deeds of trust, by maintaining records
indexed through the names of grantors and grantees.  These8
grantor-grantee indexes allow individuals and businesses contem-
plating the purchase or financing of land to investigate—or hire a
title insurer to investigate—whether a seller or mortgagor actually
owns the land being offered for sale or mortgage.  Communities9
traditionally have elected their county recorders or registers of deed;
7. See 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 4 (3d ed. 2003).
8. See 14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.03[2][b] (Michael Allan
W olf ed., 2011).
9. See id.
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these elections provide an important democratic check and balance
in the preservation of property rights.  A public, enduring, authori-10
tative, and transparent record of all land ownership provides a vital
information infrastructure that has proven indispensible in
facilitating not only mortgage finance, but virtually all forms of
commerce.  County real property records are the oldest and most11
stable metric tracking the “American dream” of family homeown-
ership.12
To facilitate their service, county recorders charge modest fees on
documents they record.  Although the amount and the method of13
calculating these fees varies considerably, a charge of about thirty-
five dollars for a mortgage is typical.  County recorders use these14
fees to fund their offices and to contribute to county and state
revenue.  Some counties use real property recording fees to fund15
other county departments such as courts, legal aid offices, schools,
and police.16
For centuries, American mortgage lenders eagerly recorded their
mortgages with county recorders because state land title laws
created incentives for recording and disincentives for not re-
cording.  For example, if a mortgagee fails to record its mortgage17
properly and then someone subsequently buys or lends against the
home and records its interest, the subsequent purchaser or lender
often can take priority over the first mortgagee.  Similarly, if a18
mortgagee assigns a mortgage to an investor, that investor eagerly
would record documentation reflecting the assignment to protect
against the possibility that the original mortgagee would assign the
same mortgage to a different investor.19
10. 76 C.J.S. Registers of Deeds § 4 (2011).
11. See Gary A. Jeffress & Lynn C. Holstein, An International Survey of Real Property
Transaction Recording Costs and Some Characteristics: A Preliminary Evaluation, 5 URISA
J. 53, 53 (1993) (suggesting recording systems are a “precondition ... of an efficient land
market”).
12. See W illiam Dollarhide, Foreword to E. W ADE HONE, LAND & PROPERTY RESEARCH IN
THE UNITED STATES, at xi (1997).
13. See Jeffress & Holstein, supra note 11, at 60.
14. See ROBERT IRWIN, TIPS AND TRAPS W HEN MORTGAGE HUNTING 62 (3d ed. 2005).
15. See Jeffress & Holstein, supra note 11, at 62.
16. See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
17. See POWELL, supra note 8, § 82.01[3].
18. See id. § 82.02[1][a].
19. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 14 N.E. 586, 588 (Ind. 1887) (“It is settled
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In the mid-1990s, some mortgage bankers decided they no longer
wanted to pay recording fees for assigning mortgages.  Securitiza-20
tion—a process of pooling many mortgages into a trust and selling
income from the trust to investors on Wall Street —drove this21
decision. Securitization, also sometimes called “structured finance,”
usually required several successive mortgage assignments to
different companies.  To avoid the hassle and expense of paying22
county recording fees, these mortgage bankers formed a plan to
create a single shell company that would pretend to own all the
mortgages in the country.  According to the plan, the mortgage23
bankers would never have to record assignments again because the
same company would always “own” all the mortgages.  They incor-24
porated the shell company in Delaware and called it Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.25
Even though not a single state legislature or appellate court had
authorized this change in real property recording, investors inter-
ested in subprime and exotic mortgage-backed securities were still
willing to buy mortgages recorded through this new proxy system.26
everywhere that unrecorded assignments of mortgages are void as against subsequent
purchasers, whose interests may be affected thereby, and whose conveyances are duly
recorded, provided such assignments are embraced by the recording acts.”); Bacon v. Van
Schoonhoven, 87 N .Y. 446, 450 (1882) (“The assignments of the ... mortgage are also
conveyances within the act. This is well settled by authority, and such assignm ents, if not
recorded, are void, not merely as against subsequent purchasers of the same mortgage, but
also as against subsequent purchasers of the mortgaged premises, whose interests may be
affected by such assignments, and whose conveyances are first recorded.”).
20. See Phyllis K. Slesinger &  Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration
System , 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 810-12 (1995) (describing an Ernst & Young study that
mortgage bankers commissioned to study how much money they could avoid paying to county
governments through the MERS system).
21. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1361-62.
22. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185,
2186-87 (2007).
23. R.K. Arnold, Viewpoint, INSIDE MERS, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 1 (“[O]ur mission is to
capture every mortgage loan in the country.”).
24. See id.; see also Howard Schneider, MERS Aids Electronic Mortgage Market,
MORTGAGE BANKING, Jan. 1997, at 42.
25. See Carson Mullen, MERS: Tracking Loans Electronically, MORTGAGE BANKING, May
2000, at 62; Schneider, supra note 24.
26. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1398. At least one state, Minnesota, later explicitly
authorized MERS recording by amending its recording act to expressly permit nominees to
record “[an] assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose.” Act of Apr.
6, 2004, ch. 153, § 2, 2004 Minn. Laws 76, 76-77 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 507.413 (2008)).
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Because the new system cut out payment of county recording fees,
recording was significantly cheaper for intermediary mortgage
companies and the investment banks that packaged mortgage
securities. Acting on the impulse to maximize profits by avoiding
payment of fees to county governments, much of the national
residential mortgage market shifted to the new proxy recording
system in only a few years. Now, about 60 percent of the nation’s
residential mortgages are recorded in the name of MERS Inc.,
rather than the bank, trust, or company that actually has a mean-
ingful economic interest in the repayment of the debt.  For the first27
time in the nation’s history, there is no longer an authoritative,
public record of who owns land in each county.
Instead, MERSCORP Inc., a company closely affiliated with
MERS Inc., now maintains an electronic database that tracks
mortgage servicing rights—in other words, the right of a company
to collect monthly payments on behalf of the actual economic owner
or owners of a loan. In lieu of paying county governments, financial
institutions pay MERSCORP membership fees and per-transaction
fees for access to the MERS database and to compensate MERS Inc.
for pretending to own the mortgages these financial institutions
register on the MERSCORP database.  Sometimes MERSCORP28
also tracks beneficial ownership rights—actual assignments—but
only if investors willingly volunteer this information.  Financial29
institutions have been cavalier about informing MERSCORP of
changes in servicing and ownership rights of mortgages, apparently
because these institutions believe no legal penalties exist for
neglecting to make this information available.
See generally Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W .2d 487 (Minn. 2009)
(interpreting this statute). However, Minnesota did not enact this legal change until long after
financial institutions already had been using the MERS system in that state. Similar changes
have not taken place nationwide.
27. See Kate Berry, Foreclosures Turn Up Heat on MERS , AM. BANKER, July 10, 2007, at 1.
28. See Schneider, supra  note 24. Unlike mortgage loan servicers that receive
compensation for foreclosure services, MERS does not receive any compensation for assisting
in foreclosures. See Deposition of R.K. Arnold at 88, Henderson v. Merscorp, Inc., No. CV-08-
900805.00 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Arnold Deposition].
29. Financial institutions have not reliably updated the MERS-maintained database when
these institutions assign loans to businesses that are not members of the MERS system. See
In re Hawkins, No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR, 2009 W L 901766, at *4 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 31,
2009).
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MERS’s rights vis-à-vis mortgages registered on the MERSCORP
database have created a conundrum for courts, borrowers, and
foreclosure attorneys. In boilerplate security agreements included
in mortgages all around the country, lenders include the following
clause:
“MERS” is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a
nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS
is the mortgagee under this Security Instrument. MERS is
organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, and has an
address and telephone number of P.O. Box 2026, Flint, MI
48501-2026, tel. (888) 679-MERS.30
This passage, and a similar passage naming MERS the benefi-
ciary in deeds of trust,  is confusing at best. On the one hand,31
MERS purports to act purely as a “nominee”—a form of an agent.
On the other hand, MERS also claims to be an actual mortgagee,
which is to say an owner of the real property right to foreclose upon
the security interest. That a company cannot be both an agent and
a principal with respect to the same right is axiomatic.  In litiga-32
tion all across the country, attorneys representing MERS frequently
take inconsistent positions on the legal status of the company,
depending on the legal issue at hand.
Both the MERS-as-an-agent and the MERS-as-an-actual-mort-
gagee theories have significant legal problems. If MERS is merely
an agent of the actual lender, the source of its authority to list itself
as a mortgagee or deed of trust beneficiary under state land title
recording acts is unclear. These statutes do not have provisions
authorizing financial institutions to use the name of a shell
company, nominee, or some other form of an agent instead of the
30. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Its Response to Defendants’ Preliminary Objections at
Exhibit A, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Blumling, No. GD-05-016795 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. May 31, 2006), available at https://dcr.alleghenycounty.us (follow “Case Search” hyperlink;
then enter “GD-05-016795” in “Enter Standard Case ID” field; then follow “Document 20”
hyperlink) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Response]. The mortgage instrument, however, names the
original lender. See id.
31. See Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Bellistri, No. 4:09-CV-731, 2010 WL
2720802, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01-.02 (2006).
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actual owner of the interest in the land. After all, the point of these
statutes is to provide a transparent, reliable record of actual—as
opposed to nominal—land ownership.33
Conversely, if MERS is actually a mortgagee, then while MERS
may have authority to record mortgages in its own name, both
MERS and financial institutions investing in MERS-recorded
mortgages run afoul of long-standing precedent on the insepa-
rability of promissory notes and mortgages. Since the nineteenth
century, a long and still-vital line of cases has held that mortgages
and deeds of trust may not be separated from the promissory notes
that create the underlying obligation triggering foreclosure rights.34
33. See Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 353-54
(1987).
34. See Kirby Lum ber Corp. v. W illiams, 230 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1956) (“The rule is
fully recognized in this state that a mortgage to secure a negotiable promissory note is merely
an incident to the debt, and passes by assignment or transfer of the note. The note and
mortgage are inseparable.” (quoting Van Burkleo v. Sw. Mfg. Co., 39 S.W . 1085, 1087 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1896))); In re Leisure Time Sports, Inc., 194 B.R. 859, 861 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that “[a] security interest cannot exist, much less be transferred, independent from
the obligation which it secures” and that “[i]f the debt is not transferred, neither is the
security interest”); In re Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 W L 2684265, at *4 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept.
7, 2007) (“‘The note and mortgage are inseparable; the form er as essential, the latter as an
incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the
latter alone is a nullity.’ ... It is equally absurd to assume that such bifurcation was intended
because such a bifurcation of the note from the deed of trust would render the debt
unsecured.” (citations omitted) (quoting Waterbury Trust Co. v. W eisman, 108 A. 550, 553
(1919))); In re BNT Terminals, Inc., 125 B.R. 963, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (“[A]n
assignment of a mortgage without a transfer of the underlying note is a nullity.... It is
axiomatic that any attempt to assign the mortgage without transfer of the debt will not pass
the mortgagee’s interest to the assignee.” (citations omitted)); In re AMSCO, Inc., 26 B.R. 358,
361 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (reaffirming that “[t]he note and mortgage are inseparable”
(quoting Waterbury Trust Co., 109 A. at 553)); Denniston v. Comm’r, 37 B.T.A. 834, 838 (1938)
(“All the authorities agree that the debt is the principal thing and the mortgage an
accessory.... The mortgage can have no separate existence.” (quoting Carpenter v. Longan, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 274 (1872))); Hill v. Favour, 84 P.2d 575, 578 (Ariz. 1938) (“The note and
mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident.”); Barton v.
Perryman, 577 S.W .2d 596, 600 (Ark. 1979) (“[A] note and mortgage are inseparable.” (quoting
Carpenter, 83 U.S. (16 W all.) at 274)); Kelley v. Upshaw, 246 P.2d 23, 30 (Cal. 1952) (“In any
event, Kelley’s purported assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt
which is secured was a legal nullity.”); First Nat’l Bank of Saco v. Vagg, 212 P. 509, 511
(Mont. 1922) (“A mortgage, as distinct from  the debt it secures, is not a thing of value nor a
fit subject of transfer; hence an assignment of the mortgage alone, without the debt, is
nugatory, and confers no rights whatever upon the assignee. The note and mortgage are
inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note
carries the mortgage with it, while the assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. The
mortgage can have no separate existence.” (citations omitted)); Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N.H.
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These cases do not merely hold that mortgages follow notes as a
matter of default law, but that mortgages legally cannot be sepa-
rated from notes. Thus, in Carpenter v. Longan, the United States
Supreme Court announced the classic statement of this rule: “The
note and mortgage are inseparable.... An assignment of the note
carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone
is a nullity.”35
As a practical matter, the incoherence of MERS’s legal position is
exacerbated by a corporate structure that is so unorthodox as to be
considered arguably fraudulent. Because MERSCORP is a company
of relatively modest size, it does not have the personnel to deal with
legal problems that its purported ownership of millions of home
mortgages creates.  To accommodate the massive amount of paper-36
work and litigation involved with its business model, MERSCORP
simply farms out the MERS Inc. identity to employees of mortgage
servicers, originators, debt collectors, and foreclosure law firms.37
MERS invites financial companies to enter names of their own
employees into a MERS web page that then automatically regurgi-
tates boilerplate corporate resolutions that purport to name the
employees of other companies as certifying officers of MERS.  These38
certifying officers also take job titles from MERS and stylize them-
selves as either assistant secretaries or vice presidents of MERS,
rather than taking titles from the company that actually employs
them.  These employees of the servicers, debt collectors, and law39
420, 430 (1831) (“[T]he interest of the mortgagee is not in fact real estate, but a personal
chattel, a mere security for the debt, an interest in the land inseparable from the debt, an
incident to the debt, which cannot be detached from its principal.”); Yoi-Lee Realty Corp. v.
177th St. Realty Assocs., 626 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (App. Div. 1995) (“The mortgage note is
inseparable from the mortgage, to which the note expressly refers, and from which the note
incorporates provisions for default.”); W est v. First Baptist Church of Taft, 71 S.W .2d 1090,
1098 (Tex. 1934) (“The trial court’s finding and conclusion ignore the settled principle that a
mortgage securing a negotiable note is but an incident to the note and partakes of its
negotiable character.... ‘The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the
latter as an incident.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Carpenter, 83 U.S. (16 W all.) at 274)); Trane
Co. v. W ortham, 428 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tex. App. 1968) (“The note and mortgage are
inseparable.” (quoting Van Burkleo, 39 S.W . at 1087)).
35. 83 U.S. (16 W all.) 271, 274 (1872) (emphasis added).
36. See Arnold Deposition, supra note 28, at 46.
37. See id. at 195-200.
38. See id. at 187-90.
39. Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin.
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firms sign documents pretending to be vice presidents or assistant
secretaries of MERS Inc. even though neither MERSCORP Inc. nor
MERS Inc. pays compensation or provides benefits to them.40
Astonishingly, MERS “vice presidents” are simply paralegals, cus-
tomer service representatives, and foreclosure attorneys employed
by other companies. MERS even sells its corporate seal to nonem-
ployees on its Internet site for twenty-five dollars each.  Ironically,41
MERS Inc.—a company that nominally owns 50 percent of the
nation’s residential mortgages—does not have any of its own
employees, but still purports to have over twenty thousand assistant
secretaries and vice presidents.  This corporate structure leads to42
inconsistent positions, conflicts of interest, and confusion.43
As millions of foreclosures have worked their way through the
judicial system, appellate courts finally have had some opportuni-
ties to analyze MERS-based recording. An increasing number of
courts are taking a dim view of MERS-recorded mortgages and
deeds of trust. To date, every state supreme court that has looked
at the issue has concluded that, despite its boilerplate language,
MERS is not a mortgagee or deed of trust beneficiary. For example,
in Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. v. Southwest Homes
of Arkansas, Inc., a first-position lender named MERS as the bene-
ficiary on its deed of trust.  Later the borrower took out a second44
mortgage that did not use the MERS system.  When the borrower45
Servs., 111th Cong. 103-04 (2010) [hereinafter Mortgage Servicing Hearing] (prepared
statement of R.K. Arnold, President and Chief Executive Officer, MERSCORP, Inc.).
40. Id.
41. See MERS Commercial Pricing, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/mersproducts/pricing.
aspx?mpid=4 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
42. Mortgage Servicing Hearing, supra note 39, at 42, 102, 170.
43. Compare Sharon Horstkamp, MERS Vice President and Corporate Counsel, Posting
to MERS Legal Forum: recording - New York, MERS (Apr. 8, 2004, 12:42 PM), http://
www.mersinc.org/forum/viewreplies.aspx?id=13&tid=73 (“Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS) gets its authority to assign and/or discharge a mortgage because MERS
is the mortgagee, and as such holds legal title to the mortgage.... The nominee language does
not take away from the fact that MERS is the mortgagee.” (emphasis added)), with
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, King v. Ocwen, 2008 W L 2063553 (E.D. M ich. Apr. 14,
2008) (No. 07-11359), 2007 W L 1985166 (arguing that MERS could not be liable for Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act violations because “HSBC was the mortgagee for the Property. Ocwen
is the servicer for the Property. [And] MERS acted solely as the nominee for the original
mortgagee of the Property.” (emphasis added)).
44. 2009 Ark. 152, at 2, 301 S.W .3d 1, 2 (2009).
45. Id. at 2, 301 S.W .3d at 2.
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fell behind on the second mortgage, the subsequent lender’s
assignee foreclosed without notifying either MERS or the real owner
of the first mortgage.  When MERS, acting through local counsel,46
attempted to set aside the foreclosure, a unanimous Supreme Court
of Arkansas, with Chief Justice Hannah writing, held that MERS
had no property rights with respect to the loan.  Even though47
MERS never had service of process, the court allowed the foreclo-
sure to stand because MERS had lost nothing.  In the court’s words,48
“MERS is not the beneficiary, even though it is so designated in the
deed of trust.”49
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court also has refused to allow
MERS to set aside a first mortgagee’s default judgment in a
foreclosure action.  In its opinion, the court diagnosed MERS’s50
schizophrenic self-characterization as a nominee and stated the
following:
What meaning is this court to attach to MERS’s designation
as nominee for Millennia? The parties appear to have defined
the word in much the same way that the blind men of Indian
legend described an elephant—their description depended on
which part they were touching at any given time.51
In response to both statutory and constitutional arguments,
Kansas followed Arkansas’s skepticism regarding whether MERS
actually owns anything: “MERS did not demonstrate, in fact, did not
attempt to demonstrate, that it possessed any tangible interest in
the mortgage beyond a nominal designation.”52
While the Arkansas and Kansas cases both involved late efforts
by MERS to set aside earlier dispositions, the Supreme Court of
Maine reached similar results when MERS itself filed a foreclosure
complaint. In Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. v.
Saunders, MERS filed a foreclosure complaint, but during the
46. Id. at 2-3, 301 S.W .3d at 2.
47. Id.  at  1,  301  S.W .3d at 2 (“Because MERS was at most the mere agent of the
lender ..., it held no property interest and was not a necessary party.”).
48. Id. at 5, 301 S.W .3d at 4.
49. Id. at 6, 301 S.W .3d at 4.
50. See Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 169 (Kan. 2009).
51. Id. at 165-66.
52. Id. at 169.
2011] TWO FACES 123
pending case, Deutsche Bank attempted to substitute itself into the
action instead of MERS.  When the trial court awarded summary53
judgment to Deutsche Bank, the borrower appealed, arguing that
MERS lacked standing and that substitution of another party
during the pending case could not cure this jurisdictional defect.54
The appeal forced the court to look at the simple question of
whether MERS had standing to bring a foreclosure action on behalf
of the real economic loan owner.  Despite contrary boilerplate55
language in the security agreement, the court flatly rejected MERS’s
ownership claim, stating: “MERS is not a mortgagee ... because it
has no enforceable right in the debt obligation securing the mort-
gage.”  Because MERS lacked standing, the court reversed sum-56
mary judgment to give the borrower an opportunity to “appropri-
ately defend the foreclosure action against the real party in inter-
est.”57
In Missouri, appellate courts have gone a step further in challeng-
ing MERS’s ownership claims vis-à-vis mortgages tracked on its
database. In Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., MERS’s
involvement in the loan effectively led to the stripping of a deed of
trust lien from the land.  In this case, a debtor borrowed money58
from a mortgage lending company named BNC Mortgage and signed
a deed of trust naming MERS as beneficiary of the trust.  After the59
loan closed, no one paid property taxes on the residence for several
years.  Eventually the local government established a tax lien and60
sold the property at auction to Bellistri.  Bellistri sent notice of the61
sale to the original mortgage lender, BNC.  While the facts of the62
case are silent on this point, BNC probably sold the loan to an in-
vestment bank for securitization shortly after origination and had
no appetite whatsoever for facilitating repayment. Hoping to make
53. 2010 ME 79, ¶ 1, 2 A.3d. 289, 292.
54. See id. ¶ 1, 2 A.3d at 292.
55. See id. ¶ 7, 2 A.3d at 293-94.
56. Id. ¶ 15, 2 A.3d at 297.
57. Id. ¶ 21, 2 A.3d at 299.
58. 284 S.W .3d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
59. Id. at 621.
60. Id. Normally, lenders or their servicing companies pay property taxes out of escrow
accounts drawn from borrowers’ monthly payments. The appellate opinion is unclear on why
the taxes were not paid in this case. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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his rights clear, Bellistri sued in state court to quiet title on the land
he had purchased.  Because the borrower still had not repaid the63
debt, Ocwen, a mortgage loan servicing company and alleged
successor to MERS, attempted to set aside the tax sale.  Ocwen64
produced an assignment of the deed of trust from MERS to Ocwen
that an Ocwen employee, apparently designated as a vice president
of MERS, had recorded. The Missouri Court of Appeals treated the
recorded assignment as a legal nullity.  Unlike many courts that65
have sidestepped the troubling issues behind the purported
severance of mortgages and notes in MERS security agreements, the
Missouri Court of Appeals attempted to analyze the issue. Looking
to the American Law Institute’s Third Restatement of Property Law,
the court stated the following:
Typically, the same person holds both the note and the deed of
trust. In the event that the note and the deed of trust are split,
the note, as a practical matter becomes unsecured. The practical
effect of splitting the deed of trust from the promissory note is to
make it impossible for the holder of the note to foreclose, unless
the holder of the deed of trust is the agent of the holder of the
note. Without the agency relationship, the person holding only
the note lacks the power to foreclose in the event of default. The
person holding only the deed of trust will never experience
default because only the holder of the note is entitled to payment
of the underlying obligation. The mortgage loan became ineffec-
tual when the note holder did not also hold the deed of trust.66
Ultimately, the court held that “MERS never held the promissory
note, thus its assignment of the deed of trust to Ocwen separate
from the note had no force.”  The court effectively quieted title in67
favor of Bellistri, stripping off the lien.
Collectively, these cases in Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, and
Missouri, as well as a growing number of trial court decisions in
other states, have cracked the edifice of the Janus-masked façade of
63. Id.
64. Id. at 621-22.
65. Id. at 623-24.
66. Id. at 623 (citations omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 5.4
cmts. a, b, c (1997)).
67. Id. at 624.
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MERS-recorded mortgages and deeds of trust. Whether financiers
will prevail upon courts to grant MERS the power to both own
mortgages and represent owners of mortgages at the same time is
now legally unclear.
II. GATHERING STORM CLOUDS OF TITLE
While cases successfully challenging MERS’s status as a mort-
gagee or deed of trust beneficiary were litigated in the context of
standing to foreclose, they also foreshadow tempestuous title dis-
putes. MERS describes itself as “an innovative process that ...
eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when
trading residential and commercial mortgage loans.”  This phrase,68
which the company uses both in legal briefs and public relations
material, hints that recording assignments in public records is
merely a useless, archaic formality.  Whether state appellate courts69
will agree that MERS eliminates the need to publicly record assign-
ments is unclear.
But even if MERS does eliminate the need to record, it most
certainly does not eliminate the need for records. The policy justif-
ications behind recording statutes are as germane today as they
were hundreds of years ago, when the first American colonies began
adopting the statutes. Society needs an authoritative, transparent
source of information about who owns land to protect property
rights, encourage commerce, expose fraud, and avoid disputes.
Recent case law has begun to show gathering judicial skepticism
regarding the privatized record keeping system that is displacing
public county systems.70
Apologists for MERS argue that so long as MERS’s name appears
in county records as a lien holder, prospective purchasers will be on
notice that they must inquire further before lending against or
buying the land.  But who exactly are these purchasers to consult?71
68. MERS, http://www.mersinc.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
69. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at Arg. 3-4, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw.
Homes of Ark, Inc., 2009 Ark. 152, 301 S.W .3d 1 (No. 08-1299).
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Response to Request from John O’Brien (Essex, Mass. Co. Register of Deeds)
to Mass. AG Martha Coakley to Investigate MERS , MERS (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.
mersinc.org/newsroom/press_details.aspx?id=254 [hereinafter MERS Response].
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MERS has maintained a toll-free phone number where homeowners
can inquire who holds the servicing rights to their mortgage.  But72
servicers themselves do not always have accurate records of their
own. Even if they did, talking to mortgage servicing company
customer service representatives, whose business incentives are
focused on cutting costs, is often unproductive, slow, and unreli-
able.  In recent years, mortgage servicing and origination compa-73
nies have gone in and out of business in cycles recalling the
permanence of a strobe light.  Even federally insured banks have74
been collapsing by the hundreds.  After seeing many loans in her75
courtroom with incomplete documentation and incoherent
transactional records, Judge Jennifer Bailey, a circuit court judge
in Miami, recently stated: “[T]here are 60,000 foreclosures filed last
year. Every single one of them— ... almost every single one of them
... —represents a situation where the bank’s position is constantly
shifting and changing because they don’t know what the Sam Hill
is going on in their files.”  The MERS database of servicing rights76
simply does not provide a commercially reliable, authoritative
source of lien information because servicers, who are in business to
make profit through providing financial services, do not have an
incentive to maintain permanent, transparent, publicly available
records of mortgage ownership.77
MERS does not systematically track all beneficial ownership
rights of the mortgages registered on its system.  Recall that MERS78
maintains a database that is only updated with information if its
members choose to do so.  When the beneficial ownership interest79
72. See MERS for Homeowners: How Can I Find Out the Identity of My Servicer?, MERS,
http://www.mersinc.org/homeowners/index.aspx#3 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (the current
phone number is 888-679-6377).
73. See Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy M ortgage Claims, 87
TEX. L. REV. 121, 131-32 (2008).
74. See W orth Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders that Have Closed
Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, W ALL ST. J. ONLINE, http://online.wsj.com /public/
resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
75. More than 300 banks have failed since 2008. Failed Bank List, FDIC, http://www.fdic.
gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
76. Transcript of Hearing on Order to Show Cause at 5, HSBC Bank USA v. Eslava, No.
1-2008-CA-055313 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2010).
77. Cf. Porter, supra note 73, at 126-28.
78. Cf. Arnold Deposition, supra note 28, at 176.
79. See id.
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in a loan changes hands, such as through negotiation of a promis-
sory note and a written assignment of the mortgage, the parties to
that transaction can send an electronic message to MERS updating
a field in the database.  MERS calls this process an “electronic80
handshake.”  But, unlike most county real property recorders,81
MERS does not keep digital or hard copies of documents that
embody such an agreement,  making it much more difficult to track82
fraud and errors through their record keeping system. Even more
troubling, it is unclear whether MERS members are legally bound
to update this information on the database.  In the words of83
MERS’s CEO, the system “is capable of being used to track [benefi-
cial ownership interests] if the members utilize it for that reason.”84
But if the MERS members choose not to use the database to reveal
themselves, MERS does not investigate further or otherwise insist
that members actually use this feature of the database.  Instead,85
MERS leaves this decision to the business model of the financial
institution.  When asked whether MERS expects financial institu-86
tions to update the MERS database regarding changes in loan
ownership, the company’s CEO replied, “not so much.”87
MERS appears to recognize that its own database is not reliable.
MERS gives the following disclaimer on all search results obtained
from its system:
DISCLAIMER: MERS makes no representations or warranties
regarding the accuracy or reliability of the information provided.
MERS disclaims responsibility or liability for errors, omissions,
and the accuracy of any information provided. MERS does not
80. Id. at 178-79.
81. Id. at 178.
82. Id. at 177-80.
83. Id. at 178-80.
84. Id. at 176.
85. Id. at 178-80.
86. Id. at 177-78.
87. The deposition transcript on this point reads:
[Nicholas W ooten, Plaintiff’s Attorney] Q. Okay. So whenever a transfer occurs
of any interest, be it beneficial interest in the promissory note or be it servicing
interest, those you expect to be entered on the MERS system? [R.K. Arnold,
MERS CEO] A. It’s not so much that we expect it. W e operate a system that
offers that capability.
Id. at 178.
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input any of the information found on the MERS® System, but
rather the MERS Members have that responsibility regarding
mortgage loans in which they hold an interest. Users of this
information have the responsibility to verify the accuracy,
currency and completeness of the information. The information
does not constitute the official legal record and is for informa-
tional purposes only. The servicer listed should be contacted for
further information.
88
In contrast, the public records maintained by county governments
do provide a record upon which one can rely, because the act of
recording with the county is recognized as legally authoritative
under state land title statutes.89
Moreover, instead of disclaiming all possible liability, most
elected county recorders have a tremendous sense of responsibility
and pride in maintaining public access to the records that define
American property rights. For example, the transcript of a 1994
meeting where MERS proponents pitched the MERS clearinghouse
concept to the National Association of Counties illustrates county
recorders’ perspective. The remarks of an elected recorder from
Kentucky provides a compelling contrast between MERS’s dis-
claimer and an elected official’s sense of responsibility: 
But you see, I am the official custodian of that data base and
everything that goes in there is required by Kentucky statutes
that says this is what goes in that database that I am officially
responsible for, and I’m held accountable for that. If what I am
officially responsible for is the assignments then my next door
neighbor is going to come in to see his record of assignment....
Now, I can provide him access to that.... This should be public
record and all of a sudden it is no longer a public record. It’s an
inconclusive file. It went in this black hole called a clearing-
house.90
88. MERS Servicer ID Overview , MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/MersProducts/index.
aspx?mpid=7 (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
89. Cf. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 50 (2011).
90. Rebecca Jackson, Clerk, Jefferson Cnty., Ky., Statement at National Association of
Counties Legislative Conference: Mortgage Assignment Issue Meeting 25 (Mar. 4, 1994)
(transcript on file with author).
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At the same 1994 meeting, another county recorder presciently
pointed out that “[i]t is a huge project to put this all together,
handling this for everybody, all over the nation. If you don’t do it
100 [percent] right, it’s going to be one big awful mess.”  91
In a laudable, but ultimately anemic, effort to respond to these
concerns and to mounting criticism of the system’s lack of transpar-
ency, MERS recently announced a new feature of its Internet web
page servicer identification system that allows borrowers to inquire
as to the identity of a loan’s investor.  However, this feature of92
MERS’s interaction with the public has several basic problems.
First, unlike the traditional public system, MERS does not reveal to
consumers the chain of ownership linking the original lender to the
current owner of the loan. MERS also does not provide copies of the
documents that purport to transfer ownership interests in the land,
making it difficult to spot forgery or errors.93
Second, the company’s press release is somewhat misleading in
that, for securitized mortgages, MERS only reveals the name of the
securitization trustee, rather than the trust it serves. Private
correspondence from MERS’s communications manager explains
that “the MERS® System only has the name of the trustee in the
Investor field and does not capture information about the trust.”94
Learning the name of a borrower’s securitization trustee does not
allow the borrower to research the pooling and servicing agreement
that controls a servicer’s or trustee’s authority to negotiate loan
modifications. It also does not identify the name of the trust that
could be liable for purchasing loans that violate the Home Owner-
ship and Equity Protection Act or other state predatory lending
laws.  Even when the borrower knows the name of a securitization95
trustee, this search result is still not a legally authoritative search
upon which a searcher may rely in ruling out the possibility of other
potential purchasers that could achieve priority in an ownership
dispute. Rather, the search is simply a query to see whether any
91. Id. at 22.
92. See MERS Expands Website To Disclose Loan Investor Information, MERS (July 16,
2010), http://www.mersinc.org/newsroom/press_details.aspx?id=241.
93. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
94. E-mail from Karmel Lejarde, Communications Manager, MERSCORP, Inc., to author
(Sept. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
95. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 2227-30 (summarizing mortgage loan assignee liability
law).
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companies happened to have used an optional electronic handshake
to enter assignment information on a private database.96
Third, the MERS servicer identification system often does not
produce any information on beneficial ownership of loans at all and
instead gives the following message: “Investor: This investor has
chosen not to display their information. For assistance, please con-
tact the servicer.”  Note that this sentence is ambiguous as to97
whether MERS even knows who owns the loan or whether the
owner of the loan actually refuses to be identified. The former
possibility is disturbing in that it illustrates that we, as a society, no
longer have a record keeping system that actually tracks legally
recognized ownership interests in land back to the root of title. The
latter possibility is disturbing because it reveals how the MERS
system has abated an important legal incentive to provide public
notice of land ownership interests.
Both updating the MERS database and publicly recording a
mortgage assignment are permissive choices for financial institu-
tions. A key difference, however, is that strong legal incentives exist
to encourage financiers to provide notice of assignments under the
public system. In contrast, the MERS system—designed by and
operated for the exclusive benefit of mortgage finance compa-
nies—deliberately undermines and altogether lacks that incentive.
Under the still-current, but presently circumvented, law of many
states, owners of an interest in land may intentionally conceal
themselves, but they do so at the risk of losing that ownership
interest.  In both notice and race-notice jurisdictions, if a mortgage98
assignee fails to record and the assignor either intentionally or
unintentionally assigns the same mortgage to a subsequent as-
signee who does record, then the first assignee can lose priority.99
96. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
97. MERS Servicer Identification System, Search for Servicer Information-Search Results
(Nov. 2, 2010) (on file with author).
98. See 66 AM. JUR. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 162 (2011).
99. See id.; see also, e.g., Second Nat’l Bank of New Haven v. Dyer, 184 A. 386, 388-89
(Conn. 1936).
That an assignm ent of a mortgage falls within the purview of the recording
statute follows from the nature of such an instrument.... Indeed, to hold
otherwise would make a serious inroad upon the policy of this state that
purchasers of interests in real estate are entitled to rely upon the land records
as disclosing the true title.
Id. at 388. This also assum es, for most jurisdictions, that the subsequent assignee did not
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Where both assignees are using the MERS system, the only
officially recorded notice would be the original mortgage in the
name of MERS. The MERS database may have no information on
whether any assignments have taken place—leaving prospective
owners and investors, and courts adjudicating the conflicts that will
develop, to speculate on who actually owns rights in the property. 
Currently, no legal disincentive exists for failing to update the
MERS database on changes in loan ownership. Because many
mortgage companies in the boom years planned to sell their loans
to investors, they focused on the short-term commissions and profits
from originating loans.  They did not implement a system that100
required public documentation that would preserve our national
legacy of certainty in property rights. As compared to the public
system, the MERS database does not provide reliable, authoritative
information on legally cognizable beneficial ownership of loans
registered in its system.  County real property records that hold101
only a reference to the MERS system now have a systemic break in
chains of title. Perhaps this situation is what MERS means by its
corporate slogan: “Process Loans, Not Paperwork.”102
The full risk of confusion and litigation from this system will not
be known for years to come. But cases already are emerging that
reveal serious clouds on title. For example, in late 2009, a Florida
mortgage origination and servicing company called Diversified
Mortgage Inc. (Diversified) sued MERS seeking a declaratory judg-
ment to resolve uncertainty over ownership of Florida mortgages
registered on the MERS system.  In its complaint, Diversified—a103
mortgage lender, rather than a borrower—alleged the following:
While the MERS system may benefit its members by enabling
them to sell, transfer, and assign mortgages amongst themselves
without the burden of documenting their transactions on paper
or in the public records, this system has wreaked havoc on our
nation’s homeowners. In fact, the system implemented by MERS
have actual notice of the first assignment.
100. See John M. Quidley, Compensation and Incentives in the Mortgage Business,
ECONOMIST’S VOICE, Oct. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss6/art2.
101. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
102. MERS, http://www.mersinc.org (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
103. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief at 1, Diversified Mortg.,
Inc. v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-02497-VMC-EAJ (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2009).
132 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:111
has essentially privatized mortgage records while undermining
the value of county public records. No longer can a homeowner
visit a government office, review the public records, and learn
the identity of who actually owns his mortgage. Doing so today
will only lead to the discovery that MERS is acting as nominee
for whichever of its paying members currently owns the mort-
gage in question. While MERS may know which member owns
a particular mortgage, the public cannot access the MERS
system; it is a private virtual playground intended for members
only. In essence, MERS’ stance towards homeowners can be
summarized as: “one of our members owns your mortgage and
that is all you need to know.” While some stories of the after-
math resulting from this secretive system have come to light,
such as those of homeowners who want to work with their
lenders to avoid foreclosure, but are unable to identify their
lenders, the full extent of the damage has yet to unfold.104
While hearing this argument from a mortgage origination and
servicing company must be edifying for critics of MERS, the case is
more interesting because of allegations about MERS’s role in
facilitating ownership disputes. In its complaint, Diversified alleged
that MERS may have allowed trading partners of Diversified to list
themselves as owners of Diversified’s loans without permission
from Diversified.  When the lender asked MERS to produce a list105
of all Diversified’s trading partners that may have claimed to own
some of Diversified’s loans, MERS either could not or refused to do
so.  After persistent requests for more information, Diversified106
alleged that MERS employees became “confusing and hostile,” and
“demanded that Diversified not attempt further contact with
MERS.”  Diversified also alleged it was “[d]umbfounded as to why107
MERS would cease communicating with a member mortgage
company, and refuse it the basic information to which it was
entitled.” Diversified “attempted further contact with MERS,” but
to no avail.  Eventually, Diversified learned that other third-party108
104. Id. at 3.
105. See id. at 5.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 6.
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financial institutions had initiated foreclosure proceedings on
mortgages that Diversified believed it owned.109
While this incident is only one example, some of the appellate
courts that have criticized the MERS system foretell further long-
term uncertainty surrounding property rights connected to MERS’s
claims of ownership. For example, recognizing the implications of its
own decision in Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, the Kansas
Supreme Court pointed out that “[i]n attempting to circumvent the
statutory registration requirement for notice, MERS creates a sys-
tem in which the public has no notice of who holds the obligation on
a mortgage.”  The Supreme Court of Arkansas went even further,110
stating that “[p]ermitting an agent, such as MERS purports to be to
step in and act without a recorded lender directing its action would
wreak havoc on notice in this state.”  And yet, the MERS system111
is designed to do precisely that. Prototypical MERS-as-original-
mortgagee transactions have no recorded lenders.  MERS is de-112
signed to be the cradle-to-grave notice proxy for all the half-dozen
or so financial institutions and shell companies that hold title to the
loan at different times, yet remain undocumented both in the public
record and often on MERS’s own database.
III. MERS AND THE PROBLEM OF CONVEYANCE
If the growing line of cases asserting that MERS is neither a
mortgagee nor a deed of trust beneficiary is correct, then courts soon
must confront profound questions about the very enforceability of
MERS’s security agreements. Not merely an ancillary issue, MERS
registered loans have fundamental problems related to the very
nature of what a mortgage is. A compelling legal argument exists
that loans originated through MERS fail to create enforceable liens.
109. Id.
110. 216 P.3d 158, 169 (Kan. 2009).
111. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 2009 Ark. 152, at 8, 301
S.W .3d 1, 5 (2009).
112. Some county recorders track the originating lender’s name in addition to MERS’s
name when a mortgage is first recorded. As mentioned above, the original lender is named in
the mortgage instrument. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Once the mortgage is
assigned, however, the name of the original lender is no longer useful and leads to a dead end
in searching for actual ownership interest in the land.
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MERS’s security agreements name MERS as the mortgagee or
deed of trust beneficiary.  Loans originated with MERS as the113
original mortgagee purport to separate the borrower’s promissory
note, which is made payable to the originating lender, from the
borrower’s conveyance of a mortgage, which purportedly is granted
to MERS. If this separation is legally incorrect—as every state
supreme court looking at the issue has agreed —then the security114
agreements do not name an actual mortgagee or beneficiary. The
mortgage industry, however, has premised its proxy recording strat-
egy on this separation, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
that “the note and mortgage are inseparable.”  If today’s courts115
take the Carpenter decision at its word, then what do we make of a
document purporting to create a mortgage entirely independent of
an obligation to pay? If the Supreme Court is right that a “mortgage
can have no separate existence” from a promissory note,  then a116
security agreement that purports to grant a mortgage independent
of the promissory note attempts to convey something that cannot
exist.117
While this argument surely will strike a discordant note with the
mortgage bankers who invested billions of dollars in loans origi-
nated with this simple flaw, the position is consistent with a long
and hitherto uncontroversial line of cases. Many courts have held
that a document attempting to convey an interest in realty fails to
convey that interest if the document does not name an eligible
grantee.  Courts around the country have long held that “there118
113. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
115. Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 W all.) 271, 274 (1872); see also Nagle v. Macy, 9 Cal.
426, 428 (1858) (“The debt and the mortgage are inseparable.”).
116. Carpenter, 83 U.S. at 275.
117. Nothing indicates that deeds of trust would be any different in this respect. See
Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535-36 (Ct. App. 1969) (“[A] deed of trust
is inseparable from the debt and always abides with the debt, and it has no market or
ascertainable value, apart from  the obligation it secures.” (emphasis added)).
118. See Richey v. Sinclair, 47 N.E. 364, 365 (Ill. 1897) (“The law is well settled that a deed
without the name of a grantee is invalid. It is said there must be in every grant a grantor, a
grantee, and a thing granted; and a deed wanting in either essential will be void.”); Disque
v. W right, 49 Iowa 538, 540 (1878) (“It has been frequently held that slight omissions in the
acknowledgment of a deed destroy the effect of the record as constructive notice. A fortiori,
it seems to us, should so important and vital an omission as that of the name of the grantee
have that effect.”); Allen v. Allen, 51 N.W . 473, 474 (Minn. 1892) (stating that an omission of
the name of the grantee invalidated conveyance because “[a] legal title to real property cannot
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must be, in every grant, a grantor, a grantee and a thing granted,
and a deed wanting in either essential is absolutely void.”  Indeed,119
this common sense rule dates back to Blackstone’s Commentaries,
which stated: “[What are] the requisites of a deed[?] ... [T]here
[must] be persons able to contract and be contracted with for the
purposes intended by the deed: and also a thing, or subject-matter
to be contracted for; all which must be expressed by sufficient
names.”  More recently, Patton and Palomar’s treatise agreed: “It120
is axiomatic that a deed will be inoperative as a conveyance unless
it designates someone to whom the title passes. A grantee is as
necessary to the validity of a grant as that there should be a grantor
or a property granted.”121
An 1862 New York Court of Appeals case illustrates this point.
In Chauncey v. Arnold, a debtor attempted to create an “in blank”
mortgage comparable to a negotiable instrument payable to
bearer.  Rather than specifying the name of the actual mortgagee,122
the debtor left the name of the mortgagee blank, presumably with
the intention of facilitating a subsequent transfer of the mortgage
to any interested party willing to invest in it.  This temporary123
exclusion might make some sense in that writing a security agree-
ment with no stated mortgagee might have the potential to facilitate
easy transfer of the mortgage, just like banks quickly transfer
personal checks that payors have endorsed in blank. Leaving the
name of the mortgagee silent was likely an effort to eliminate the
need to draw up, and perhaps pay recording fees on, a subsequent
assignment of the mortgage.
be established by parol”); Chauncey v. Arnold, 24 N.Y. 330, 335 (1862) (“No mortgagee or
obligee was named in [a mortgage], and no right to maintain an action thereon, or to enforce
the same, was given therein to the plaintiff or any other person. It was, per se, of no more
legal force than a simple piece of blank paper.”); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 306 (2011) (“Notice
may be deemed not present in cases of insufficient attestation or where the instrument itself
is so defective as to be void as a matter of law, as where it wholly om its the name of the
mortgagee.” (citations omitted)).
119. W hitaker v. Miller, 83 Ill. 381, 385 (1876); see also Trout v. Taylor, 32 P.2d 968, 969
(Cal. 1934); Green v. MacAdam, 346 P.2d 474, 477 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Beard v. Griggs,
24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 22, 25 (1829); Allen, 51 N.W . at 473; Morris v. Stephens, 46 Pa. 200, 201
(1863); Hulsether v. Peters, 167 N.W . 497, 498 (S.D. 1918).
120. 2 W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296.
121. PALOMAR, supra note 7, § 338.
122. 24 N.Y. at 331.
123. See id.
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Unlike mortgages, promissory notes and drafts may be made
“payable to bearer.”  This legal language in an instrument allows124
any person in physical possession of the bearer paper—including
even a thief—to demand payment from the maker in the case of a
note, or the drawee in the case of a draft.  Negotiable instruments125
have this feature because the architects of Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, following the English common law set out by
Lord Mansfield that preceded it, believed that transfer of the right
to receive payment by mere possession of the instrument was useful
in enhancing the liquidity of the payment right.  Nonetheless, in126
Chauncey, the trial court, intermediate appellate court, and New
York’s highest court all agreed that the attempt to convey an in
blank mortgage failed.  As the Court of Appeals explained, “[n]o127
mortgagee or obligee was named in [the security agreement], and no
right to maintain an action thereon, or to enforce the same, was
given therein to the plaintiff or any other person. It was, per se, of
no more legal force than a simple piece of blank paper.”128
The Supreme Court of California reached a similar result in a
deed of trust case. In Trout v. Taylor, a shady finance company in-
duced “an elderly woman, without business experience, and of very
limited schooling and education” to sign a blank deed conveying
her land.  After execution and delivery of the deed, the finance129
company filled in the name of company insiders, took out a few
loans against the land, and sold them to investors.  In analyzing130
whether the deed was enforceable, the court pointed to the absence
of a named grantee, and held that “the deed in question was not
voidable, but was void in toto; a nullity.”131
An Illinois Supreme Court case provides an interesting contrast.
In Richey v. Sinclair, a debtor simultaneously signed a promissory
124. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a)(1), -109(a) (2010).
125. See id. §§ 1-201(b)(21), 3-301 (2010).
126. Edward L. Rubin, Learning from Lord Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for
Modern Commercial Practice, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 775, 777-86 (1995).
127. See Chauncey, 24 N.Y. at 332 (“[T]he cases arising upon bills and notes are plainly
distinguishable.”).
128. Id. at 335.
129. 32 P.2d 968, 968 (Cal. 1934).
130. Id. at 969.
131. Id. at 970.
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note and a mortgage.  The note specified the name of the creditor,132
but due to a drafting error, the mortgage did not specify the
creditor’s name, leaving the identity of the mortgagee unintention-
ally ambiguous.  While the Illinois Court of Appeals held the133
mortgage was unenforceable, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed.134
The court agreed in principle that mortgages that do not specify a
mortgagee are unenforceable.  But it pointed out that particular135
circumstances of the case—including the simultaneously executed
promissory note identifying a payee, and boilerplate language
within the mortgage document indicating that the mortgagee was
the same person as the note payee—made the identity of the
mortgagee sufficiently clear to remain enforceable.  In comparison,136
the case for enforcement of MERS loans is arguably worse because
MERS never appears on the promissory note and is a different party
than the actual economically interested business.
There are the occasional cases in which some form of agency
relationship or nominal mortgagee is held not to invalidate a mort-
gage. For instance, Louisiana’s pre-UCC civil code mortgage law
seems more tolerant of nominal mortgagees. For example, in the
1919 case of Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. White,
the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed a prospective borrower to list
what it called a “nominal mortgagee” when the borrower made a
bearer paper promissory note with no payee listed at the outset of
the transaction.  When the bearer paper note was later negotiated137
for value to a third party by the mortgagor, the Louisiana Supreme
Court labeled the original mortgagee a “nominal mortgagee” and
held that the lien was still valid.  However, this case is distin-138
guishable from MERS cases because the origination documents did
not separate the note from the mortgage by naming a different
payee in the note than the mortgagee listed in the security agree-
ment.  Since the note was payable to the bearer, it left open the139
132. 47 N.E. 364, 364 (Ill. 1897).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 365.
136. Id.
137. 81 So. 753, 754 (La. 1919).
138. Id.
139. See id. The case’s applicability to common law jurisdictions is also dubious insofar as
it explicitly relies on the Napoleonic Code for support. See id. at 755.
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possibility that the mortgagee could be the bearer of the note, and
thus did not run afoul of the much more established line of cases
holding that mortgages are inseparable from notes.  But even more140
fundamentally, any supportive case MERS and its members find
will still have the potential to be distinguished by a state supreme
court, including Louisiana, that believes its legislature did not
authorize this type of change to the system. And those courts will be
on solid ground because, realistically, state legislatures and the
common law simply have not willfully granted permission for one
shell company, owned by banks and operated from Washington,
D.C., to act as the entire nation’s pretend owner of mortgages. Land
title statutes and the common law of property conveyance contem-
plate recording and transfer by many different actual mortgagees
and deed of trust beneficiaries,  not by one single shell company141
that stands in the place of the entire industry. The mortgage
industry will not find a case that binds a state supreme court to hold
otherwise because no fact pattern has emerged in American history
that would have given a state supreme court the opportunity to
ratify this radical change to the land title statutes and our common
law heritage of mortgage origination.
The Chauncey decision from New York and cases like it have long
lain dormant as settled and uncontroversial law.  Indeed, since the142
mid-nineteenth century, the often harshly introspective New York
appellate courts have never limited or distinguished Chauncey. The
reason must lie in a simple, common sense recognition that we
ought not allow parties to transfer interests in land if the true
identity of the party that receives the granted land is not plain,
clear, and presently revealed at the time of the attempted convey-
ance. Unlike simple monetary payment rights that habitually are
created and extinguished every day of a consumer’s life, the
conveyance of land has a special place in American law.  The lives143
140. See supra note 34.
141. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., In re Stubbs, 330 B.R. 717, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2005), superseded by
statute, IND. CODE ANN. § 32-21-4-1 (West 2010), as recognized in In re Gysin, 409 B.R. 485
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009).
There is no other “thing” more important historically in our culture that [sic] an
interest in land, whether that interest be in a condominium, in a house, or in
[sic] farm. Land. The transferring of interests in land has been entrusted to a
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and fortunes of generation after generation of America’s middle
class turn more on their ownership of land than on any other
asset.  Just like the Chauncey court, American jurists traditionally144
have recognized that the conveyance documents of land rights must
memorialize ownership carefully and clearly.  If a grantor—be it145
a prospective mortgage debtor or even one who wishes to convey fee
simple title to land as a gift—wants to transfer an ownership
interest in that land, surely the grantor easily can specify who will
receive it in the document that purports to make the conveyance.
Reminiscent of the Chauncey facts, MERS mortgages and deeds
of trust attempt to create the equivalent of bearer paper mortgages.
Just as the debtor in Chauncey left the name of the mortgagee
blank, debtors in MERS-as-original-mortgagee loans do nearly the
same thing by attempting to convey the property interest to a
nationally ubiquitous proxy that has no meaningful financial
intention of taking that interest. The line of cases that hold MERS
is not a mortgagee suggests that MERS security agreements are
essentially silent on the identity of the mortgagee. By inducing
debtors to specify a hollow placeholder as the grantee of their
property interests, mortgage bankers have attempted to create a
completely fungible mortgage in which the true owner of the lien, or
the land itself in title theory states, becomes whomever the error-
prone, virus-infected computer records of mortgage loan servicers
say it is.146
Even under the jurisprudence most favorable to MERS with
respect to the severability of notes and mortgages, whether MERS-
as-original-mortgagee security agreements can effectively convey a
mortgage remains unclear. Some courts have held that under very
limited circumstances, mortgages are severable from notes, but that
prior to foreclosure, the ownership of the note and the mortgage
must be unified in one party that both suffers a default and asks the
system of records that allows people to be certain that this single most
im portant asset in their lives is indeed going to be theirs, and that the
encumbrances recorded with respect to this asset are in fact accurate and valid.
Id. (citation omitted).
144. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, W EALTH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA 16 (1999).
145. See supra notes 118-19.
146. See Porter, supra note 73, at 132; Gretchen Morgenson, Dubious Fees Hit Borrowers
in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, at A1, A24.
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court for a remedy.  Under this view, some courts might be willing147
to reunite the mortgage with the note, possibly satisfying some
concerns over standing to foreclose.  But even this controversial148
line of cases, which is not supported by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Carpenter, does not clearly stand for the proposition that
a contract can create a mortgage severed at the outset from an
obligation. Such a view would require the reversal of cases like
Chauncey and would risk great mischief in property conveyance law,
which has always had high standards for clarity of language in
deeding and bequeathing property.  This rule therefore is tanta-149
mount to allowing the conveyance of a property interest that is
unenforceable because the mortgage grantee would not have a
foreclosure right. To convey a mortgage that does not include a
foreclosure right is to convey nothing at all. Moreover, allowing the
creation of a mortgage separate from the note will expose mortgag-
ors to a constant threat of double liability because the holder of the
promissory note and a different owner of the mortgage may both
show up at different times demanding payment.  Over the long150
term, the more simple, sustainable, and conflict-deflating rule will
be to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s position in Carpenter that
mortgages and deeds of trust remain inseparable from the obliga-
tion that triggers foreclosure rights.
147. See, e.g., 5-Star Mgmt. v. Rogers, 940 F. Supp. 512, 521 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
The Court observes that a determ ination that the mortgage at issue, having
been separated from the underlying promissory note, may be unenforceable
would not leave the plaintiff in possession of a worthless instrument. This
conclusion obtains because the plaintiff presumably can sell the mortgage to the
holder of the underlying obligation. The plaintiff also can purchase the
underlying obligation from the holder of the note. In that case, plaintiff, as
holder of both the mortgage and the note, could foreclose on the mortgage on the
New York Property.
Id.
148. The inherent problem in this position is determining how MERS would assign the
mortgage to someone if it is not a mortgagee. Surely, MERS cannot assign something that it
does not own. Even if MERS is attempting to assign the mortgage as an agent, to whom
MERS is assigning the mortgage remains unclear. After all, the security agreement does not
specify who, other than MERS, owns the mortgage in the first place.
149. 23 AM. JUR. 2d Deeds § 38 (2011).
150. See 5-Star Mgmt., 940 F. Supp. at 520 (“To allow the assignee of a security interest
to enforce the security agreement would expose the obligor to a double liability, since a holder
in due course of the promissory note clearly is entitled to recover from the obligor.” (quoting
In re Hurricane Resort Co., 30 B.R. 258, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983))).
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In a stunning betrayal of the policies that ground the ancient
statute of frauds principle, which commands that we commit
transfers of land interests to writing,  mortgage bankers using151
MERS wrote millions of mortgage loans that did not specify the
actual mortgagee. For over one hundred years, U.S. courts have held
that “legal title to real property cannot be established by parol.”152
Had the parties to these transactions simply specified in the
documents who owns what, they could have avoided a vast amount
of confusing litigation and commercial uncertainty. These anchor-
less liens now flail in the wind of our commercial tempest. Courts
that come to understand this situation will be in a bitter predica-
ment. On the one hand, if they employ a tough-love policy—inval-
idating liens because the liens do not specify a mortgagee—courts
will throw the mortgage market into further turmoil. On the other
hand, if the courts write opinions allowing MERS to act as a
ubiquitous national proxy mortgagee, courts will write into the
American common law fundamental legal mischief that will plague
generations to come.
In the short term, granting the true loan owner, if one can be
identified, an equitable mortgage could temper the harsh conse-
quences of opinions that insist on security agreements that name an
actual mortgagee. Traditionally, courts of equity were sometimes
willing to imply an equitable mortgage in cases in which the par-
ties to the transaction intended to have security for the loan, but
failed to comply with formal conveyance requirements.  Generally153
speaking, the elements of an equitable mortgage include the
following:
(1) the mortgagor has a mortgageable interest in the property
sought to be charged as security; 
(2) clear proof of the sum which it was to secure; 
(3) a definite debt ... to be secured, due from the mortgagor to
the mortgagee; and 
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 110(1)(d), 127 (2010).
152. Allen v. Allen, 51 N.W . 473, 474 (Minn. 1892).
153. See 54A AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 13 (2009).
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(4) the intent of the parties to create a mortgage, lien or charge
on the property sufficiently described or identified to secure the
obligation.154
The sensible policy behind the rule is to give effect to the
substance of the transaction rather than its form.  This equitable155
doctrine seems to fit the circumstances of MERS-as-mortgagee loans
because borrowers clearly intended to grant security interests.
Generally, reasonable borrowers should not expect to receive a home
for free. Awarding equitable mortgages to securitization trusts could
strike a reasonable balance in the interests of borrowers and lenders
without ignoring the fact that the standard security agreement does
not name an actual mortgagee.
Even in the absence of an equitable mortgage, borrowers that did
not succeed in conveying a lien still signed the promissory note and
generally will owe an unsecured debt. Creditors can sue on unse-
cured debts and, within the limits of state-exempt property statutes,
obtain judicial liens on family homes.  Of course, this process is156
more time consuming than foreclosure and is subject to intervening
liens. Moreover, it will be more difficult given the state of the fi-
nancial industry’s records. Given this situation, some judges in the
trenches of judicial foreclosure have already held that the mortgage
industry’s reckless underwriting of unsuitable loans and irre-
sponsible documentation of ownership justifies extreme equitable
remedies.157
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Burkhardt v. Bailey, 680 N.W .2d 453, 465 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (“An
equitable mortgage places the substance of the parties’ intent over form.”).
156. See, e.g., C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of M issing W ords and the
Order of Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265 (1992).
157. See HSBC Bank USA v. Yeasmin, 911 N.Y.S.2d 693, slip op. at 5 (Sup. Ct. May 24,
2010) (cancelling foreclosure action on MERS recorded loan in an order that states: “[T]he
instant motion, attempting to cure the four defects explained by the Court [in a previous
order] are so incredible, outrageous, ludicrous and disingenuous that they should have been
authored by the late Rod Serling, creator of the famous science-fiction television series, The
Twilight Zone.”); Order at 2-4, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Lippi, No. CA08-0127 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2010) (dismissing foreclosure complaint with prejudice on MERS-recorded
loan for failure to show any evidence of standing, following two years of litigation and multiple
dismissals with leave to amend); Transcript of Hearing on Order to Show Cause at 4-6, 10,
17-18, 20, HSBC Bank USA v. Eslava, No. 1-2008-CA-055313 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2010)
(dismissing foreclosure complaint with prejudice, cancelling promissory note, and conveying
clear title to homeowner as a sanction for poor record keeping and failure to comply with a
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While awarding equitable mortgages surely is a better approach
for financiers and their investors than simply invalidating liens,
this solution would not solve all of their problems. Replacing legal
mortgages with equitable mortgages would give borrowers and
subsequent lien holders significant leverage. Historically, state law
has not uniformly treated equitable mortgagees vis-à-vis other
competing creditors. Although the holder of an equitable mortgage
generally had priority against judgment creditors,  an equitable158
mortgage likely could be avoided in bankruptcy proceedings.159
Moreover, financiers likely would have less luck seeking deficiency
judgments when foreclosing on equitable mortgages.  Perhaps160
most importantly, as financiers bargain in the shadow of losing
their legal mortgage, they might become more inclined to offer
realistic modification agreements. The judicial threat of invalidating
mortgages and replacing them with less tactically useful equitable
mortgages could decrease courts’ dockets by forcing securitization
trustees and servicers to the negotiating table.
  IV. WHAT ABOUT THE MONEY? THE RIGHT OF COUNTIES TO  
RECOVER UNPAID RECORDING FEES
At the most simple level, mortgages and deeds of trust recorded
at origination represent that MERS is the mortgagee or deed of
trust beneficiary.  Taking the appellate decisions in Arkansas,161
Kansas, Maine, and Missouri at face value,  mortgages naming162
MERS as the mortgagee contain a false statement. Accordingly,
MERS and its members use false information to avoid paying
recording fees to county governments. While MERS-recorded mort-
gages and deeds of trust have qualifying language suggesting that
MERS is also a nominee,  the representation that MERS is the163
owner of the lien is not some innocuous legalism. It causes county
court order).
158. See, e.g., Pagenhardt v. W alsh, 243 A.2d 494, 498 (Md. 1968).
159. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006); In re Paul J. Paradise & Assocs., Inc., 217 B.R. 452, 455
(Bankr. D. Del. 1997); Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Denison, 133 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Ohio 1956);
Mortg. Lenders Network, USA v. Sensenich, 873 A.2d 892, 894 (Vt. 2004).
160. See, e.g., Clayton Dev. Co. v. Falvey, 253 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613 (1988).
161. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 2212.
162. See supra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
163. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 2212.
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recorders that maintain grantor-grantee indexes to list MERS in the
chain of title for the land. The false designation of MERS as a
mortgagee or beneficiary creates a false lead in the true chain of
title that defeats an essential purpose of recording mortgages and
deeds of trust.
Perhaps even more troubling are the documents recorded in the
name of MERS later in the life of mortgage loans. Recall that
MERS’s business model does not include MERS actually recording
documents relating to its purported ownership.  Instead, it allows164
employees of mortgage servicing companies and law firms to do so
on its behalf.  MERS has a web page in which mortgage servicers165
and law firms can enter names of their own employees to automati-
cally produce a boilerplate corporate resolution that purports to des-
ignate the servicers’ and law firms’ employees as certifying officers
of MERS with the job title of assistant secretary, vice president, or
both.  These servicer and law firm employees then sign and record166
documents such as mortgage assignments, substitution of deed of
trust trustees, substitutions of deed of trust beneficiaries, and
mortgage releases—all including the representation that they are
MERS vice presidents or assistant secretaries. Some states require
that the individual signing a document conveying a corporation’s
interest in land have the job title of vice president or higher.167
Surely, this policy is to better assure that the signatory has the
requisite authority and can thereby better prevent mistakes,
confusion, and disputes over land ownership. But many servicer and
law firm employees unnecessarily use the vice president title—
perhaps just because it just sounds better.
And yet, this representation is not true. The representation that
employees of mortgage servicing companies and foreclosure law
firms are vice presidents of MERS is, at best, disingenuous. In the
English language, the term vice president primarily means “an
officer next in rank below a president and acting as president in
case of that officer’s absence or disability.”  Sometimes, vice168
164. See supra notes 20-27, 79-87 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
166. MERS System Lite Tool Kit, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id
=246&table=ProductFile (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
167. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 692.02 (2010).
168. W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2549 (3d ed. 2002).
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president can mean “one of several officers serving as a president’s
deputies in charge of particular locations or functions.”  The reality169
of what MERS vice presidents actually do, from whom they receive
their paychecks, and their actual job titles is fundamentally
inconsistent with a corporate officer that serves as president when
the president is disabled or acts as the president’s deputy. 
A deposition transcript taken from a foreclosure case brought by
a Florida debt collection law firm is illustrative.  The deponent was170
a nonattorney employee of the firm that was claiming MERS
certifying officer status.  The employee was responsible for signing171
twenty to forty mortgage assignments per day that MERS would
record with county officials.  The firm’s rationale for allowing this172
action was one of the boilerplate corporate resolutions taken off of
MERS’s website that stated: “The attached list of candidates are
employees of Florida Default Law Group and are hereby appointed
as assistant secretaries and vice-presidents of MERS.”  When this173
vice president of MERS was asked about her relationship with
MERS she responded as follows:
Q Did you have to have any sort of training to become a Certified
Officer?
A No.
Q Do you know where MERS is located?
A No.
Q Have you ever been there?
A No.
Q Have you ever spoken with anyone at MERS?
A No.
Q Have you ever had e-mail transmissions back and forth
with anyone from MERS?
A No.
...
Q Do you file any reports with MERS relating to assignments?
A No.
169. Id.
170. See Deposition of Kimberly Litchfield at 36, W ells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Van Siegman,
No. 16-2008-CA-009724 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2008).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. MERS, http://www.mersinc.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (on file with author).
146 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:111
Q Do you know who the president of MERS is?
A No.
Q And I guess at some point, somebody explained to you that
you were a Certified Officer is that correct? ....
A Yes.
Q And what do you remember as to their explanation as to what
that meant?
A Why I was being chosen as a Certified Officer?
Q Yes.
A That it was actually a group of us, we had one meeting and
they explained that people that had an understanding of
what an assignment was were going to go ahead and
become certified officers because we then had authorization
to execute on behalf of MERS.174
That MERS can consider an individual who is not an employee of
the company, has never been to the company’s location, does not
know where the company is located, has never met the company’s
president, does not know who the president is, and has never
communicated personally with the company in any way to be a vice
president of that company is inconsistent with even the most
expansive definition of the term vice president. A belief is not true
simply because it is convenient.
Perhaps the designation of servicer and law firm employees as
assistant secretaries of MERS is less absurd, but it is still mislead-
ing. While many of these servicer and law firm employees are
secretarial workers in the businesses that actually employ them,
they are not assistant secretaries of MERS in any meaningful
economic sense. They have no more contact with MERS than
MERS’s so-called vice presidents do. Indeed, the fact that MERS’s
boilerplate resolutions allow the employees to pick which title they
want to use is compelling evidence that the whole concept is
twaddle. MERS does not pay assistant secretaries, and they receive
no employee benefits. In another example of Orwellian doublespeak,
the financial institutions and law firms pay MERS to allow them to
pretend that they have MERS employees.  Who pays to be an175
174. Deposition of Kimberly Litchfield, supra note 170, at 39-41; see also In re Haque, 395
B.R. 799, 805-06 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (imposing $95,130.45 in sanctions on Florida Default
Law Group for filing affidavit claiming entitlement to unjustified interest charges).
175. See MERS Commercial Pricing, MERS, www.m ersinc.org/MersProducts/pricing.
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assistant secretary?  While mortgage brokers and financiers may176
be keen on entrusting the nation’s real property records to a
company with these standard business practices, one can imagine
that this situation might make the democratically-elected county
recorders that have dedicated their professional careers to preserva-
tion of land ownership rights somewhat uncomfortable.
County recorders deserve payment of recording fees for assign-
ments avoided through the use of documents containing false
statements. Recording of these documents caused a reduction in the
revenue that county governments would have collected from
mortgage financiers. MERS used projections of this reduction in
revenue in its sales pitches and marketing material.  Indeed, the177
studies done by accountants that justified the creation of MERS
show how use of the MERS system, which entailed recording
arguably false documents, would cause a reduction in fees paid to
counties.178
But perhaps most compelling, pooling and servicing agreements
packaging mortgage loans into securities legally require finance
companies to publicly record, and pay recording fees on, every
assignment of a non-MERS mortgage loan from origination through
deposit in a securitization trust. A 2005 Pooling and Servicing
Agreement between J.P. Morgan Chase’s subprime subsidiary as a
depositor, J.P. Morgan Chase’s actual bank as servicer, and
Wachovia Bank as trustee provides a typical example.  The pool179
aspx?mpid=1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (containing a complete schedule of membership and
transactional fees members pay to MERS).
176. Ironically, MERS sometimes charges a fee to members when it has to forward mail
addressed to MERS to the member that actually has an interest in the loan. See MERSCORP,
INC., RULES OF MEMBERSHIP R. 5, § 4, http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=
172&table=ProductFile (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
If MERS determines that MERS receipt of mail involving a foreclosure
proceeding, lawsuit or code violation resulted from a violation of any of the
MERS Rules or Procedures, then MERS shall be entitled to charge the Member
a fee of $12.00 for each filing or document in the proceeding or for each piece of
mail received related to the code violation that MERS forwards to the Member
beyond the initial service of process or notification that MERS received on behalf
of that Member.
Id.
177. See, e.g., MERS Response, supra note 71.
178. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 20, at 810-12.
179. Chase Mortg. Fin. Corp., Current Report, Pooling and Servicing Agreement (Form 8-
K) (Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Chase Agreement].
148 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:111
included both non-MERS and MERS loans but had different
assignment recording warranties for each.  In the agreement, J.P.180
Morgan Chase’s subprime subsidiary promised to turn over to the
securitization trustee “[o]riginals of all recorded intervening
Assignments of Mortgage, or copies thereof, certified by the public
recording office in which such Assignments or Mortgage have been
recorded showing a complete chain of title from the originator to the
Depositor, with evidence of recording.”  Conversely, in the case of181
MERS-recorded loans, the same agreement does not require
recording of intermediate assignments. Instead, it only requires the
depositor to take “such actions as are necessary to cause the Trustee
to be clearly identified as the owner of each such Mortgage Loan on
the records of MERS.”  In this typical securitization deal, J.P.182
Morgan Chase used the MERS system to duck a contractual
obligation it otherwise would have incurred to produce recorded
assignments for every non-MERS loan included in the pool—even
though counties depend on the revenue that those assignments
produce.
To many outside the finance industry, using false documents to
avoid paying fees to the government sounds a lot like tax fraud. If
county governments sue to recover unpaid recording fees, MERS
and its member financiers will probably argue that tax fraud is
distinguishable from using false documents to avoid paying
recording fees. In typical cases of unpaid taxes, some underlying
obligation to pay exists by virtue of statutory tax law. But in
recording fee cases, the underlying choice to record a mortgage or
assignment and pay the required fee is permissive under state land
title laws.  Thus, the following argument exists: while the use of183
allegedly false statements may have caused financiers to choose not
to pay recording fees, financiers were free to assume the risk of this
choice. Taxes, unlike recording fees, are not permissive.
However, courts offended by financiers using allegedly false
documents to avoid paying fees do not need to play the financier’s
music as written. The common law of unjust enrichment suggests
one possible route for recovery of county recording fees. The general
180. Id. at 34.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 36.
183. See MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006).
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principle of unjust enrichment is that a person ought to make
restitution for the reasonable value of unfairly received property or
services.  Although a complete discussion of this ancient and184
complex legal doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article, three
elements are typical in most states: 
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and
(3) the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its
value.  185
County recorders provide a service of promulgating legally sufficient
public notice of real property liens in exchange for a fee; this service
is also known as “perfecting.”  Members of the MERS system186
certainly appreciate and understand the importance of perfecting,
and maintaining perfection of, their mortgages. The more difficult
question is whether it is inequitable for financial institutions
participating in private securitization conduits, where loans are
transferred three, four, or even more times, to receive the benefit of
a continuous and seamlessly perfected mortgage when they used
false statements to pay only one recording fee.
Many cases allow restitution for the value of services provided in
enhancing land ownership rights. A common narrative in these
cases arises where laborers, contractors, and subcontractors make
improvements to land where there is no contractual basis for
recovery. In typical cases, a landowner retains a contractor to
improve land, and then the contractor hires a subcontractor. The
subcontractor makes improvements but is not paid by the contrac-
tor—often because of insolvency. Courts facing this situation have
frequently forced the landowner to pay restitution to the subcontrac-
184. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 428 (2011).
185. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 12 (2001). For an interesting
discussion of comparative historical origins of unjust enrichment doctrine, see generally
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: KEY ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (David Johnston &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004).
186. See, e.g., Keith D. Haroldson, Perfecting a Security Interest in Future Rents from
Mortgaged Property, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 287, 294 (1991).
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tor when the landowner has not already paid the contractor for the
services rendered by the subcontractor.  Such lawsuits may be187
particularly viable where there is “evidence that the owner misled
the subcontractor to his or her detriment, or that the owner in some
way induced a change of position in the subcontractor to his or her
detriment, or some evidence of fraud by the owner against the
subcontractor.”  The pattern of facts facing county recorders is188
different in that the services county recorders provide increase the
value of a mortgage, rather than fee simple land ownership interest,
but it is hard to see why this is a difference that ought to matter.
The MERS system is similar to these cases in that the investment
banks that sold mortgage loans into securitization trusts attempted
to avail themselves of the benefit of selling a properly recorded
mortgage without paying the costs of proper recording. Also, these
financial institutions obtained this service without paying its full
cost through recording false statements with county officials.
Moreover, it makes no difference that the plaintiffs in these cases
would be county governments rather than private litigants.
Historically the law of unjust enrichment has more generously
favored granting restitution to county governments for recovery of
mistakenly bestowed benefits.  For instance, the American Law189
Institute’s Restatement of Restitution states that:
A person who has conferred a benefit upon another because
of an erroneous belief induced by a mistake of law that he is
under a duty so to do, is entitled to restitution as though the
187. See Costanzo v. Stewart, 453 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); Idaho Lumber,
Inc. v. Buck, 710 P.2d 647, 656 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); Encore Constr. Corp. v. SC Bodner
Constr., Inc., 765 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Sachs Elec. Co. v. HS Constr. Co., 86
S.W .3d 445, 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Paschall’s, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W .2d 150, 154-55 (Tenn.
1966); Lasich v. W im penney, 278 P.2d 807, 815 (Wyo. 1955); J.R. Kemper, Annotation,
Building and Construction Contracts: Right of Subcontractor Who Has Dealt Only with
Primary Contractor to Recover Against Property Owner in Quasi Contract, 62 A.L.R.3d 288,
295 (1975) (“Perhaps the most commonly cited of such latter considerations has been the
fact—in cases where it was such a fact—that the landowner had already paid to the general
contractor all, or a very substantial part, of the amount due the latter under the terms of the
primary agreement between them, and that to allow the subcontractor to recover from the
landowner would therefore be to require him to pay twice.”).
188. Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified W aste Servs., Ltd., 910 P.2d 839, 847 (Kan. 1996).
189. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 6 of Caribou Cnty. v. Mittry, 226 P. 1076, 1076 (Idaho 1924)
(“The rule that voluntary payments made by reason of mistake of law cannot be recovered
applies to individuals, but not to municipal subdivisions of the state.”).
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mistake were one of fact if ... the benefit was conferred by a
State or subdivision thereof.190
This rule is even more protective of county governments than
ordinary citizens in that many jurisdictions only grant restitution
to private litigants for mistakes of law where they are accompanied
by misrepresentation.  The public policy behind lowering the bar191
for county restitution suits comes from the special role of govern-
ment and the need to protect public funds and publicly funded
services. While these cases generally involve recovery of funds paid
rather than the value of services provided, the combination of this
line of cases with those awarding restitution for services rendered
in improving the value of land ownership rights is a compelling
foundation of precedent upon which county governments might
proceed.  Moreover, lest one doubt the potential for significant192
liability to municipal and county governments based on restitution
theories, one need only recall that some of the successful tobacco
litigation cases were premised on restitution for medical expenses
paid by governments in treating diseases of uninsured tobacco
smokers.193
Furthermore, a lawsuit to recover unpaid county recording fees
could be buttressed by the argument that MERS and its members
should be judicially estopped from denying liability for unpaid
recording fees. Courts have held that “a party will not be permitted
to maintain inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to
a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one
previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was charge-
able with, full knowledge of the facts.”  The policy behind judicial194
estoppel is “to preclude one who prevents a thing from being done
from availing himself of the nonperformance which he has himself
190. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 46 (1937).
191. Id. § 55.
192. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 6, 226 P. at 1076 (overpayment by town to contractor); Dunne
v. City of Fall River, 104 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Mass. 1952) (allowing city to recover money paid
for services under either a mistake of law or fact); W ayne Cnty. v. Reynolds, 85 N.W . 574, 574
(Mich. 1901) (overpayment of services by county clerk).
193. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Am . Tobacco Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 (E.D. Mo.
1999).
194. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 71 (2000) (citation omitted).
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occasioned.”  Courts are particularly likely to use estoppel where195
the party making inconsistent representations accepts some benefit
from the misrepresentation.  At the time of origination, and in196
many foreclosure cases, members of the MERS system maintain
that MERS owns the mortgage. But when the time comes to deposit
the mortgage loan into a securitization trust, they maintain that the
depositor owns the mortgage.197
The J.P. Morgan Chase securitization pooling and servicing
agreement is again illustrative. Through this agreement the depos-
itor warrants that “the Mortgage Loan, including the Mortgage Note
and the Mortgage, [are] not subject to an assignment or pledge, and
the Depositor had good and marketable title to and [is] the sole
owner thereof.”  Trust depositors claim to own the mortgage they198
are selling to investors because they want to ensure that courts will
recognize the trust’s assets as purchased through a true sale. True
sale opinions were a sine qua non of securitization deals because
rating agencies would not give satisfactory credit ratings to secu-
rities drawn from pools of assets that the trust does not actually
own.  And all rights to a mortgage loan must be deposited into the199
trust for it to achieve tax exempt status under federal REMIC law,
which does not contemplate the use of a proxy mortgagee.  Yet200
despite claiming sole ownership of mortgages sold to investors, these
same institutions maintain that MERS is the sole owner of the
mortgage in documents regularly recorded with county officials. 
The chain of financial institutions linking originators to secur-
itization depositors collectively want to have their lien and sell it
too. When financiers talk to investors, they claim to own mortgages
to convey the sense that they own what they are selling. But when
195. Id.; see also Pannunzio v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 151 N.E.2d 545, 553 (Ohio 1958)
(Taft, J., concurring) (“[A] defendant cannot be permitted to rely upon his own intentional
failure to perform a duty owed to an innocent party as the basis for a defense against that
party.”).
196. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 65 (2000).
197. See Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. Inc. v. Saunders, 2010 ME 79, ¶ 4, 2 A.3d 289, 292-
93.
198. Chase Agreement, supra note 179, § 3.01(l) (emphasis added).
199. Michael S. Gambro & Scott Leichtner, Selected Legal Issues Affecting Securitization,
1 N.C. BANKING INST. 131, 162-63 (1997); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener
for Lemons, 74 W ASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1069 n.34 (1996).
200. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 671, §§ 860A-860G, 100 Stat. 2085,
2308-2318, at 860F9(a)(2)(A)(I) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860G (2010)).
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financiers talk to the government, they claim not to own what they
are selling so as not to obligate themselves to pay fees associated
with owning it. MERS and its members avoid the payment of
recording fees on assignments—the whole point of MERS—but then
attempt to avail themselves of the protection that such an action
would have afforded. The law of judicial estoppel gives state courts
the power to pull back MERS’s two-faced mask by estopping
financial institutions from denying liability for intermediate
recording fees.
Of course the equitable remedy of judicial estoppel requires courts
to consider whether justice is served by requiring financial institu-
tions to pay fee assignments that were left unrecorded through use
of MERS’s subterfuge. Here, a stark and ironic contrast exists be-
tween some of the largest financial institutions that benefited from
the recording subterfuge and the budget crises facing many county
governments. While financial institutions are defending the practice
of recording arguably false documents to avoid paying modest fees,
county governments have been laying off teachers,  firefighters,201 202
police officers,  and infectious disease clinic workers;  closing203 204
201. See Nick Anderson, Clock Ticks for 100,000 Teachers, W ASH. POST, May 27, 2010, at
A1, A8 (“California is ground zero for the school budget crisis. The most populous state, with
a budget deficit of $19 billion, is shedding summer school, music and art classes, bus routes,
days from the school year, and yet-uncounted thousands of teachers.”).
202. See Josh Brogadir, Lawrence Fire Layoffs Create Burden for Surrounding Towns, NEW
ENGLAND CABLE NEWS (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.necn.com/08/11/10/Lawrence-fire-layoffs-
create-burden-for-/landing.html?blockID=288296; Matt Byrne, Layoff Cause [sic] Station to
Close, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/malden/2010/08/
10_firefighters_laid_off_1_sta.html; David Giambusso & James Queally, Newark Submits
Plan to Eliminate Nearly 1,000 City Jobs, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 26, 2010, http://
www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/08/preview_of_newarks_layoff_plan.html; Derek Spellman,
Police, Firefighter Layoffs Take Effect in Neosho, THE JOPLIN GLOBE (Joplin, Mo.), Aug. 10,
2010, http://www.joplinglobe.com/local/x1388785750/Police-firefighter-layoffs-take-effect-in-
Neosho.
203. See Sandra Livingston, Ashtabula Judge Says People May Want to Arm Themselves
Since Budget Cuts Have Slashed Law Enforcement, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2010/04/ashtabula_judge_says_people_ma.html (“Budget cuts
have whacked Ashtabula County so hard that just one sheriff’s cruiser now patrols 720 square
miles, raising a troubling question: W ho will protect residents of this sprawling, rural
Northeast Ohio county when sheriff’s deputies are miles away? A county judge has a
suggestion: Concerned people may want to arm themselves.”).
204. See Lisa Schnirring, State Cuts Accelerate Public Health Funding Shortfall, CENTER
FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POLICY (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/
cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/mar0110funding.html (“The National Association of
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) said today in a statement that the departments
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criminal detention centers for violent juveniles;  and shuttering205
courthouses.  Surely some courts will find it offensive for the206
mortgage industry to argue that it can use false documents to avoid
paying recording fees at a time when counties are laying off
elementary school street crossing guards.207
cut 16,000 jobs last year.”).
205. See Mike Corn, Detention Center Closing, HAYS DAILY NEWS (Hays, Kan.), June 1,
2010, http://www.hdnews.net/story/juvenile053010; Juvie Center Closing Could Give Teen
Thugs Their Freedom , TRENTONIAN, May 21, 2009, http://www.trentonian.com/articles/
2009/05/21/news/doc4a14c34dc6d8b165050805.txt; Dan Linehan, Juvenile Detention Center
to Close: Blue Earth County Drops Its Com mitment, FREE PRESS (Mankato, Minn.), July 2,
2010, http://mankatofreepress.com/local/x1703948488/Juvenile-detention-center-to-close; P.J.
Reilly, Detention Centers Struggling; Loss is County’s Gain, INTELLIGENCER J. NEW ERA
(Lancaster, Pa.), July 29, 2010, at A1.; Tom Brennan, Budget Cuts Could Close County
Juvenile Detention Center, TAMPA BAY ONLINE (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www2.tbo.com/
content/2010/jan/29/budget-cuts-could-close-county-juvenile-detention-1; Ann Kelley, Budget
Cuts May Close Shawnee Juvenile Detention Center, OKLAHOMAN (May 24, 2010), available
at http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-regional-local/14507996-
1.html; Monm onth County Could Close Juvenile Detention Center, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.) (Jan. 24, 2009), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/01/monmonth_county_issues_
report.html; State May Close Maximum Security Juvenile Detention Center, 8 NEWS NOW (Feb.
16, 2010), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/11995433/state-may-close-maximum-security -
juvenile-detention-center.
206. See W illiam M. W elch, Court Budget Cuts Swift Hand of Justice, USA TODAY, Apr. 1,
2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-31-court-cuts_N.htm (“At least 15 states
have put court workers on furloughs, eight have cut pay, six have imposed layoffs, and six
have closed courtroom s to save money in the face of state funding cuts, even as the number
of legal cases is rising.”); Christina Pazzanese, Boston’s Trial Court to Make ‘Devastating’
Employment Cuts, Courthouse Closures, MASS. LAW. W KLY. (July 19, 2010), available at
h t t p : / / w w w . a l l b u s i n e s s . c o m / l a b o r - e m p l o y m e n t / h u m a n - r e s o u r c e s - p e r s o n n e l -
management/14847036-1.html (“Trial Court officials have announced they are moving ahead
with plans to lay off hundreds of workers and to relocate or shutter 14 courthouses state-
wide.”).
207. See Crossing Guards, Parents Worry About Kids’ Safety, CHILLICOTHE GAZETTE
(Chillicothe, Ohio), Aug. 28, 2010, available at 2010 W LNR 17205710; Brock Parker, Being
Laid Off by Schools, Arlington Crossing Guards Appeal to Selectmen, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13,
2010, http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/arlington/2010/04/being_laid_off_by_schools_
arli.html; Christopher Ramirez, Northfield Crossing-Guard Cuts Upset Parents, PRESS OF
ATLANTIC CITY, Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/top_three/article_
0bdf5dee-46a6-11df-9498-001cc4c03286.html; Peggy Cassidy, Be Kind to Your Soon-To-Be
Laid Off Crossing Guard, NBC CHICAGO (June 9, 2009), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/
local-beat/Crossing-Guards-Traffic-Aides-Face-Layoffs.html.
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V. REBUILDING A TRUSTWORTHY REAL PROPERTY RECORDING
SYSTEM
Counsel for financial institutions, federal and state housing
agencies, and title insurance companies need to take a candid,
reflective look at the implications of mortgage bankers’ efforts to
usurp government control of real property records. Even those who
prefer minimalist government must recognize that in a democratic
republic, divestment of this responsibility from government to in-
dustry should occur only with the consent of elected representatives
of the people. In this case, the early involvement of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac—federally sponsored corporations that deserve respect
for their efforts to facilitate American homeownership—did not
dispense with the sovereign right of state governments to control
their own real property recording law. Laws for the states are made
by the states, not by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could take a step toward restoring
national trust by stepping away from the MERS system and
requiring traditional recording practices in qualified loans. With
their many critics in Congress, the last thing the GSEs need is to
take on the political and legal risks associated with MERS.208
As financial services companies begin to rebuild their loan
portfolios and take steps toward restarting the securitization of
residential mortgages, they should insist that mortgage brokers and
originators deliver only non-MERS loans. Underwriters, as well as
credit rating agencies, should demand much more careful attention
to indicia of credit quality, as well as legal formalities such as
physical note delivery and mortgage recordation. The “Process
Loans, Not Paperwork” mantra still espoused by MERS  is a209
symptom of the industry’s cavalier and self-defeating attitude
toward attention to detail. Legal compliance—apparently what
MERS calls “paperwork”—may create short-term savings for
brokers and servicers, but it does so at the expense of substantial
long-term risks and headaches for consumers, subsequent investors,
208. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 148-49, 151 (May 6,
2011) (“At this time, we cannot predict the ultimate outcome of these legal challenges to
MERS or the impact on our business, results of operations and financial condition.”).
209. See MERS, supra note 102.
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and title companies. Legal counsel for title insurance companies in
particular should counsel their clients on the need to adjust
insurance underwriting to reflect potential exposure to MERS
liability. Refusing to insure MERS loans is perhaps too drastic a
step and would clog up the liquidity of the housing market, but
charging a steeper premium to reflect the real and growing risks
associated with MERS’s purported ownership makes sense.
Communities around the country have elected and hired county
recorders to act as the custodians of their property rights.  Those210
recorders who agree that the MERS system poses a threat to real
property records have an obligation arising from their office to
reclaim and restore faith in land title records. While some individ-
ual county recorders may reasonably feel reluctant to take on a
powerful national system backed by some of the nation’s largest
financial institutions, this is precisely what they were hired to do
when necessitated by the course of events. If county recorders do not
protect county real property records, who will? A pathway to
reclaiming authority over real property records could involve joining
with other recorders to raise a unified voice. State and national
county recorder trade associations could have a significant impact
on pending cases by submitting amicus curiae briefs. Courts are
likely to respect county recorders’ expertise in maintaining and
preserving transparent records, both because of recorders’ experi-
ence and because of their democratic mandate. Even more to the
point, county recorders should consider appealing directly to the
courts to stop financial institutions from recording these documents.
In lawsuits to recover unpaid recording fees, counties could hire
private counsel on contingent fee agreements that would place no
financial burden on county taxpayers.
The more hesitant recorders will hold up the New York Court of
Appeals decision in MERSCORP v. Romaine as an argument for
inaction.  In that case, the clerk of Suffolk County, New York,211
obtained an opinion from the Attorney General of New York stating
that the MERS system illegally circumvented New York’s real
210. See, e.g., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, §§ 82.01-.02; Frank Mulholland,
Judge Kiley Swears-in Newly Elected Office Holders, SHELBYVILLE DAILY UNION (Shelbyville,
Ill.), Dec. 1, 2010, http://Shelbyvilledailyunion.com/local/x622284575/Judge-Kiley-Swears-in-
Newly-Elected-Office-Holders.
211. 861 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 2006).
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property recording statute.  Based on this opinion, Suffolk County212
began refusing to accept MERS documents for recording.  MERS213
sued, and Romaine appealed the Appellate Division’s ruling up to
the highest court in New York on an expedited basis.  In a split214
decision, the New York Court of Appeals sided with MERS, holding
that the Suffolk County clerk did not have the statutory authority
to refuse to accept documents for recording.215
Although MERS succeeded in forcing Suffolk County to accept
MERS documents, the scope of the Romaine decision is actually
quite narrow. The case merely holds that county recorders, as minis-
terial officers, cannot decide which documents to accept.  As a216
concurring opinion explicitly stated, the decision saved for another
day all of the other pressing questions, including whether MERS-
recorded documents actually provide valid notice under New York
law and whether mortgages can be severed from notes.  The217
opinion also does not address—perhaps because the justices were
unaware of it—MERS’s highly questionable practice of having
thousands of vice presidents all over the country.  Moreover, the218
final appeal was decided in 2006, at a time when the mortgage
industry still appeared to be flying high. Whether the outcome of the
case would have been the same had it been decided a year or two
later is unclear. Other state supreme courts will address this issue
de novo, and very well may view the New York decision with the
critical eyes of hindsight. Ultimately, Chief Judge Kaye’s prescient
dissenting opinion may prove more persuasive:
The lack of disclosure may create substantial difficulty when a
homeowner wishes to negotiate the terms of his or her mortgage
or enforce a legal right against the mortgagee and is unable to
learn the mortgagee’s identity. Public records will no longer
contain this information as, if it achieves the success it envi-
212. See id. at 83.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 82-83.
215. See id. at 84-85.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 85 (Ciparick, J., concurring) (“I wish to note ... that to the extent that the
County and various amici argue that MERS has violated the clear prohibition against
separating a lien from its debt and that MERS does not have standing to bring foreclosure
actions, those issues remain for another day.”).
218. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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sions, the MERS system will render the public record useless by
masking beneficial ownership of mortgages and eliminating
records of assignments altogether. Not only will this information
deficit detract from the amount of public data accessible for
research and monitoring of industry trends, but it may also
function, perhaps unintentionally, to insulate a noteholder from
liability, mask lender error and hide predatory lending
practices.  219
Especially in states such as Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Maine, and
Missouri—where courts are already on record as taking a dim view
of the MERS system —a unified legal challenge by county220
recorders would be a formidable blow to the long-term prospects of
the MERS system.
Even county recorders who are reluctant to enter into court
battles still can exert a positive influence on the law by encouraging
state legislators to explicitly reassert traditional principles of
recording law. State legislators should, at a minimum, consider
enacting explicit bans on the use of nominees to obscure actual
economic ownership of interests in land from the land records.
Legislatures also could explicitly require that county records include
recorded assignments reflecting each transfer of beneficial owner-
ship of the loan from the original lender to the current owner prior
to allowing home foreclosure, especially in nonjudicial foreclosure
states.  Moreover, state legislatures should consider legislation221
clarifying that a recording in the name of a nominee does not pro-
vide notice sufficient to perfect a mortgage or deed of trust within
that state. This provision would empower a state’s citizens with
substantial negotiating leverage and—particularly in struggling
states such as California, Florida, Nevada, and Ohio—would inject
tremendous new energy into financial institutions’ thus far
lackluster efforts to modify ill-advised loans.
Also, the time may have come for learned legal associations, such
as the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to develop a model law
219. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d at 88 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part).
220. See supra Parts II, III.
221. Cf. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W .2d 487, 491 (Minn. 2009)
(discussing the passage of section 507.413(a) of the Minnesota Statutes).
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assisting legislators in reasserting the need for, as well as the
reforming of, public land title records. Looking toward the future,
states need to create modern, uniform standards to facilitate effi-
cient electronic recording without jettisoning democratic govern-
ment control of this vital infrastructure. In particular, the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws should at least consider the possibility of a new
article of the Uniform Commercial Code dedicated to mortgage
loans. Such an article is long overdue, has prospects of successful
passage in the wake of this crisis, and emphatically would reassert
the influence of these organizations in the wake of the disappointing
reception of the revised Article Two on sales law.222
Finally, the nation’s judges should recognize that, despite
crushing caseloads, mortgage foreclosure cases are no longer routine
matters. Putting aside the short-term consequences of enforcing the
law, jurists surely should know that ratifying a security agreement
that does not specify a true grantee—when never authorized by
state legislatures or Congress to do so—is poor lawmaking. Perhaps
we should not be too surprised that the mortgage finance industry’s
bacchanal of pump-and-dump mortgage origination happened to
coincide with a bizarre and unsustainable theory of land title
ownership. But ratifying a standard industry practice of conveying
rights to realty without specifying a true grantee inevitably will
cause hidden liens, cases of exposure to double liability, and fraud.
It will introduce long-term systemic instability, raise the cost and
uncertainty of title insurance, and result in future businesses and
individuals investing in land, only later to discover that they
received nothing. Just as the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
treated our largest financial institutions as too big to fail, our courts
might be tempted to capitulate to a silly, but nonetheless too-
incredible-not-to-believe, interpretation of the law. Decisions that
allow security agreements that do not specify the identity of the
actual mortgagee would be, in a sense, only the latest judicial
version of a mortgage banker bailout policy. Unlike the other two
branches of government, however, the greatest asset of an independ-
ent judiciary is its willingness to uphold the rule of law rather than
222. See, e.g., W illiam H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS.
L.J. 131, 131 (2009).
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second guess the consequences of doing so. Substituting equitable
mortgages in the place of facially defective security agreements is
a responsible middle path out of the mess that MERS created.
CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes the still-unfolding implications of the dual
role claimed by MERS in home mortgages and deeds of trust. On the
one hand, MERS asserts that it is solely a nominee of the lender.
But on the other hand, MERS claims that it is a mortgagee or deed
of trust beneficiary. Taking the former view, a growing line of cases
has asserted that MERS is not a mortgagee or deed of trust
beneficiary, but rather has a limited form of agency.  This223
assertion is almost certainly the correct view, given that MERS
lacks any economic interest in the mortgages and deeds of trust it
claims to own. Yet the consequences of this view, and the two-faced
security agreements that underlie it, are still unfolding.
MERS, a company that does not actually own any interests in
land, increasingly inserts inert gaps in county recorder grantor-
grantee indexes that disseminate the chain of title to millions of
homes. This growing separation between actual ownership and
legally-recognized public notice is likely to significantly undermine
the usefulness of real property recording systems over the long
term. Moreover, courts traditionally have held that a security
agreement that fails to name a mortgagee is void.  Because MERS224
is not really a mortgagee, financial institutions are, in effect, asking
that courts treat lenders and their assigns as mortgagees even
though their own security agreements do not. Even if courts reform
void security agreements into equitable mortgages, the resulting
litigation is likely to pose significant challenges for financial
institutions seeking to foreclose, obtain deficiency judgments, and
petition for relief from bankruptcy law’s automatic stay. 
Furthermore, this inconsistent position taken by financial
institutions to avoid paying modest fees to county recorders faces
potential challenges. Many counties rely on fees from mortgage and
deed of trust assignments to fund the vital services they provide to
223. See supra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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their communities. Courts that take offense to this avoidance, or to
the use of tens of thousands of uncompensated vice presidents, could
use their equitable powers under the doctrines of unjust enrichment
and judicial estoppel to compel financial institutions to pay their
unpaid recording fees. Looking toward the future of American
mortgage finance, counsel for financial institutions should advise
their clients on the real and growing risks associated with using the
MERS system. County recorders, state legislatures, and the
judiciary each need to do their part to restore confidence, stability,
and transparency in public land title records.
While MERS may reflect Janus in its two-faced land title theory,
a demystified narrative of the company is actually quite simple.
Hubris was the essential theme in Greco-Roman mythic tragedies
and was the vital sin of figures like Icarus, Narcissus, Niobe,
Arachne, and Ulysses. Each found tragedy after their overweening
pride showed disrespect to deities and the basic values those deities
embodied. MERS and its members believed that they could rewrite
property law without a democratic mandate. Although our myths
have changed, many of our courthouses and capital buildings
continue to this day to bear resemblance to Greek and Roman
temples as homage to the values of humility and respect for the rule
of law. The unfolding drama of the MERS system will tell us much
about whether those values still endure.
